Technical Meeting on the Safety and Security Interface: National Approaches and Experience

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Background

- Nuclear safety and nuclear security both aim to **protect people, society and the environment**
  - many actions enhance both
  - some actions that strengthen one could adversely impact the other

- **Defence in depth** is used in both; the same **management system** covers both

- The 2010 publication **The Interface Between Safety and Security at Nuclear Power Plants (INSAG-24)** discusses NPPs

- **AdSec & INSAG** are considering a joint report covering developments since 2010

IAEA

Background (cont')

- IAEA General Conference resolutions **GC(61)/RES/8 and GC(61)/RES/9:**

  "Requests the Secretariat … to continue facilitating in close cooperation with Member States a coordination process to address their interfaces in a timely manner, and encourages the Agency to develop safety and security publications, ensure consistency and to foster culture"

- IAEA **Safety Fundamentals: SF-1**, and IAEA **Nuclear Security Fundamentals, NSS20**:

  Security measures and safety measures have to be designed and implemented in an integrated manner so that security measures do not compromise safety and safety measures do not compromise security

Technical Meeting on the Safety and Security Interface

27 October to 2 November 2018; 140 external participants

- Aimed to:

  - **identify and present the most important safety and security interfaces and the current management approaches** for facilities and activities

  - identify **challenges, gaps and good practices**

  - **discuss and recommend future IAEA activities**

- 5 workings groups:

  - **Legal and Regulatory Framework**

  - **Nuclear Installations**

  - **Radioactive Sources, Associated Facilities & Activities**

  - **Management Systems, Nuclear Safety & Security Culture**

  - **Emergency Preparedness & Response**

Legal and Regulatory framework

TM findings	Recommendations to the IAEA
• Coherent and consistent handling of the safety and security interfaces in legislative and regulatory frameworks is needed • Common terminology is needed to improve understanding of the interface issues • A strengthened ability to handle communication, transparency and confidentiality aspects of the interfaces, in particular in relation to security is needed	• Support to the creation of **clear definitions of the roles and responsibilities** of regulatory bodies, competent authorities and operators • Address the safety security interface in its **publications** and offer **guidance for safety and security considerations** in the regulatory framework • Provide guidance on **comprehensive consequence analysis** for scenarios triggered by security events • Further **develop and align the IAEA safety and security glossaries** and consider creating a single glossary.

Nuclear Installations

TM Findings	Recommendations to the IAEA
• When designing nuclear installations, safety and security should be integrated and their interfaces addressed. • Modifications and equipment are categorized differently in safety and security. • The need for transparency can be difficult to fulfil considering the need for confidentiality.	• Provide advice to Member States on **risk-based decision-making.** • Support the **exchange of international experience** and feedback for safety and security. • Strengthen and offer **combined safety and security assistance** programmes. • Provide advice to Member States on how to **integrate security measures into nuclear installation design** at an early stage. • Provide advice to Member States on **SMR siting** that considers safety and security interfaces.

Radioactive sources, associated facilities and activities

TM Findings	Recommendations to the IAEA
• The process of adopting regulations to manage the nuclear safety and security interface is a challenge for some MS • A harmonization of security requirements for transport would facilitate effective handover arrangements • There is a need for national security requirements and authorizations to respect the consignor's safety responsibilities as outlined in the IAEA safety standard **Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (SSR-6)**	• Develop and offer **cross-cutting training courses in both safety and security** for regulators and for operating organizations • Prepare a **module for the nuclear safety and security interface in review service missions** • Increase the **scope of IAEA security guidance on transport** to strengthen the focus of international harmonisation and the dangerous goods regulatory framework • Develop **guidance and recommendations for management arrangements to resolve conflicts in the decision-making process** and confidentiality issues

Management systems, nuclear safety and security culture

TM Findings	Recommendations to the IAEA
• Security culture is considered as a subset of safety culture • Responsibilities for safety and security are assigned to different bodies – there is a need for cooperation among them; • Safety and security culture and their interface requires that both safety and security personnel are involved in regulatory functions • Organizations benefit from addressing all elements of the safety/security interface.	• **Reconcile the roles and responsibilities for safety and security** in IAEA publications; • Consider **developing a methodology or tool for the evaluation of the culture regarding the safety and security interface** • Support Member State **training programmes to enhance training** of all staff in both safety and security.

Emergency Preparedness and Response

TM Findings	Recommendations to the IAEA
• The facility, authority and state levels all are affected by the safety security interfaces • Safety and security have different approaches and need to be coordinated, in particular through the decision-making processes and the assigning of responsibilities • Emergency exercises offer an opportunity to address the safety and security interfaces	• Ensure that cross-cutting issues involving nuclear safety and security in **emergency preparedness and response are identified and addressed** in a harmonized manner • Consider **developing guides on how to implement the safety standards and the nuclear security guidance** taking into account safety and security aspects • Continue conducting and **supporting training on key areas of the safety and security interface** related to emergency preparedness and response • Continue conducting exercises (ConvEx) based on scenarios initiated by security events

Technical Meeting outcome report

- **Very close to finalization**
- First in a new series - **Technical Reports Series**
- Will include:
    - **Insights from IAEA publications**
    - **National experiences and practices**
    - **Cross-cutting issues**
        - **Staffing, competence, education and training**
        - **Definition of interface**
        - **Terminology**
        - **Transparency and confidentiality**
        - **Future developments**

Thank you!