Public information management during a response to nuclear security event: robbery of radioactive material in BF

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Introduction

- **Nuclear Materials (Pu; U; Th)**
  - No NM in Burkina Faso
  - There are traces of U in the north side, and the West *(BUMIGEB - Société canadienne Géotech Airborne*)

- **Radioactive materials in Burkina Faso (catégorie 1 à 5) :**

- **Médicale** (Tc*99; Co-60)
- **Non médicale** (sources: Ir-192, Cs-137; Am241-Be; Sr-90…);

Introduction

Nuclear application in Burkina Faso

Mining

NDT

Construction

Nuclear medecine

Research

RADIOTHERAPY

National framework to respond to nuclear security incident



International legal instruments

- CPPNM and its Amendment (April 2014)
- Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
- Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
- International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
- International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
- International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
- United Nation Security Council Resolutions UNSCR 1540

National framework to respond to nuclear security incident

national legal framework

- Law N°032-2012 relating to nuclear safety, Security and safeguards
- Law 060-2009 / AN of 17 December 2009 on the repression of terrorist acts in Burkina Faso. With the Law 084-2015 / CNT of 17 December 2015 amending Law 060.
- Law 016-2016 / AN of May 3, 2016 on the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing in Burkina Faso.
- Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP)

- Decree on transport security of radioactive materials
- Decree on inspections modalities
- Draft decree on security of use and stored radioactive materials

National framework to respond to nuclear security incident

- National capabilities

National framework to respond to nuclear security incident

- **National capabilities**
  - Mobile Expert Support Team (RB)
  - Customs for the detection at the borders. They have RPM and also equipped with some Identifinder and PRD
  - USIGN is Gendarmerie Counter-terrorist unit. They have been trained for the nuclear security during MPE and to deal with a NSE.
  - PTS (technical and scientific police) for Radiological crime scene management and the nuclear forensic
  - UIP (Counter-terrorist unit)
  - Fire Brigade
  - Operators

National framework to respond to nuclear security incident

- **Existing coordination**
- National Defense and security council exists with the aim to combat terrorism in Burkina Faso
- The main issue is to face to an existing threat relating to nuclear security .
- The current coordination is based on a generic procedure



National framework to respond to nuclear security incident

- **Response framework (examples)**

Management of the nuclear security event

Scenario (reported to ITDB)

The regulatory Body ARSN has been contacted by the company OK to notify a theft of Moisture/density gauge containing Cs-137 and Am-241/Be sources in a relevant store in December 2017.

The guards were absent from the site for such a while because of wage arrears of several months.

The security forces are still investigating in cooperation with the regulatory body to recover the radioactive source.

Management of the nuclear security event

Management of the incident

- Information gathering : the information has been provided by the operator to ARSN
- Notification : ARSN has notified to the Gendarmerie
- Interdiction : Gendarmerie has started the investigation after visiting the store with ARSN, this investigation is still on going in collaboration with other competent authorities (police, intelligence, operators …)
- Public information management : the information has been released without any coordination between the authorities

Management of the public information

First approach of public information

Challenge in the national security context characterized by terrorist attacks

Step 1: ARSN has been contacted,

Step 2: regulatory body has notified to the security forces

Step 3: law enforcement has proceeded to manage the public information



Management of the public information

Consequences

Large interpretation

First approach

Fake news

Defamation &
Panic in the population

Example of fake news

Management of the public information

Good approach of PI

• CA meet in order to agree for a right approach and the info.

• Released de right information to the public Using the official channel

• Give some instruction for radiation protection issues and recovering.



Lessons learned from the incident

- Existing of a national framework
- Existing of the collaboration
- No a systematic coordination among the CA;
- It is necessary to have a framework for the response to NSE;
- the relevant national framework is the national response plan (BF has a draft of national strategy for detection and response, NSDR)

Coordination:

- **organizing people or groups**
- **work together properly and well for effective results**

Conclusion

- There is **collaboration** among CA working for the development and the implementation of the nuclear security regime;

Legal instruments, **INSSP**, national capabilities to detect and respond to nuclear security event

Coordination of the activities needs to be strongly established for effective response activities such as the public information management.

A national framework: NSDR/ NSE with a Detection architecture and the response plan.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION
Welcome in Burkina Faso